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cease to exist or to lose our human nature in exchange for a plant-like life. Since this is impossible, we are 
left with our human means of seeking deliverance. While Cioran generally condemns human attempts at 
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Keywords 
Cioran, salvation, writing, suicide, lucidity 
This article is available in Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature: https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol38/iss1/2 
 
Falling into Salvation in Cioran 
 
Joseph Acquisto 
University of Vermont 
 
In the world of E.M. Cioran’s writings, there seems at first to be little 
room for ideas about salvation. His authorial voice, speaking to us from an 
undefined time and space, constantly reminds us that we are condemned to live 
and to suffer, and that lucidity demands not only that we recognize that no god 
can save us, but also that we excise any notion of hope or progress from our view 
of the hostile world and our accursed place in it. What role could any talk of 
salvation have in such a world where it seems laughable even to use the word? 
And yet Cioran does return, again and again, to the idea of salvation, most 
especially in middle-period works such as La chute dans le temps (The Fall into 
Time), Le mauvais demiurge (The New Gods), and Ecartèlement (Drawn and 
Quartered). Like the idea of God, the notion of salvation haunts Cioran’s texts 
even though lucidity reminds us of the impossibility of either’s existence, a state 
of affairs that leads to what Susan Sontag has called Cioran’s “tortured thinking” 
(Sontag 14). While his declarations about salvation are, as always, categorical, an 
attempt to establish a full portrait of his view of salvation draws us into a rich 
network of other related themes, revealing the complexity of his view as it is 
articulated throughout many different works. In this essay, I attempt to articulate 
Cioran’s complex, innovative, and multifaceted view of salvation. I argue that 
while he proposes several potential nontraditional sources of salvation, and in this 
sense retains a traditional focus on the possibility of salvation even while 
departing radically from the Christian version of it, these new kinds of salvation 
are always temporary, provisional, and in constant need of renewal.  
A passage in the Précis de décomposition (A Short History of Decay) 
suggests the complex terrain Cioran navigates when he approaches the notion of 
salvation, which for him would cancel life rather than prolonging or improving it: 
 
Une doctrine du salut n’a de sens que si nous partons de l’équation 
existence-souffrance. ... Le salut finit tout ; et il nous finit. Qui, une fois 
sauvé, ose se dire encore vivant ? … Le salut ne hante que les assassins et 
les saints, ceux qui ont tué ou dépassé la créature ; les autres se vautrent—
ivres morts—dans l’imperfection… 
Le tort de toute doctrine de la délivrance est de supprimer la poésie, climat 
de l’inachevé. Le poète se trahirait s’il aspirait à se sauver: le salut est la 
mort du chant, la négation de l’art et de l’esprit. Comment se sentir 
solidaire d’un aboutissement ? Nous pouvons raffiner, jardiner nos 
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douleurs, mais par quel moyen nous en émanciper sans nous suspendre ? 
Dociles à la malédiction, nous n’existons qu’en tant que nous souffrons. 
(O 604)1 
 
A doctrine of salvation only makes sense if we start from the equation 
existence-suffering. … Salvation finishes everything, and it finishes us. 
Once saved, who would dare call himself still alive? … Salvation haunts 
only assassins and saints, those who have killed or gotten beyond the 
creature; others wallow—dead drunk—in imperfection… 
The error of all doctrines of deliverance is to suppress poetry, climate of 
the unfinished. The poet would betray himself if he aspired to save 
himself: salvation is the death of song, the negation of art and spirit. How 
to feel solidarity with an end? We can refine, cultivate our pains, but by 
what means could we emancipate ourselves from them without suspending 
ourselves? Docile to malediction, we exist only inasmuch as we suffer. 
  
Salvation here becomes a temptation, just as living itself is for Cioran a 
temptation, even though we would know, if we were sufficiently lucid, that it 
would be better not to live than to live.2 To be saved is to pass into a realm of 
changelessness, which by definition opposes itself to life and the constant 
progression through time. To believe in salvation of any kind is to be convinced 
that there could be a kind of life that is better than the form it takes now, which 
for Cioran is non-sensical since to live is to suffer. Cioran implies that we are not 
often able to face the full consequences of such an affirmation; the temptation to 
end suffering is also the temptation not to exist. We are tempted both to exist and 
not to exist, for different reasons and at different times, but neither option, it 
seems, is permanently justifiable or desirable, since, as we shall see below, we 
rarely find ourselves in a sufficiently lucid state to affirm the desirability of non-
existence. Already in this passage, we see a set of interrelated themes and 
characters—life rightly understood, art, suffering, poets, and saints—that will 
frequently accompany Cioran’s considerations of suffering throughout his works. 
We shall see below that Cioran comes back in his later writings to the figure of 
the poet and writer and maintains the link between them and salvation, but in 
different ways than he proposes here in the Précis. 
 To act in the world—whether by creating works of art or simply by living 
daily life—requires maintaining a state of illusion, since lucidity leads directly to 
inaction because it reveals the futility of acts of any kind, and here Cioran 
explicitly mentions salvation as one of those acts which we would renounce 
instantly in a sufficiently lucid state: “Que si tous nos actes—depuis la respiration 
jusqu’à la fondation des empires ou des systèmes métaphysiques—dérivent d’une 
illusion sur notre importance, à plus forte raison l’instinct prophétique. Qui, avec 
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la vision exacte de sa nullité, tenterait d’être efficace et de s’ériger en sauveur ?” 
(O 584) ‘If all our acts—from breathing to the foundation of empires or 
metaphysical systems—derive from an illusion about our importance—all the 
more so does the prophetic instinct. Who, with an accurate vision of his nullity, 
would try to be effective and to set himself up as a savior?’ Rather than aspiring 
to find or be a saviour, it would be best to meditate eternally on that impossibility; 
at least that would remove us, like monks, from the via activa ‘active life’ and 
allow us to contemplate the truth of our existential predicament of being able 
neither to live nor not to live. Cioran in fact reclaims monastic space as the locus 
of these new kinds of world-renouncing reflections:  
 
A nous autres il nous faudrait des cloîtres aussi dépossédés, aussi 
vides que nos âmes, pour nous y perdre sans l’assistance des cieux, et 
dans une pureté d’idéal absent, des cloîtres à la mesure d’anges 
détrompés qui, dans leur chute, à force d’illusions vaincues, 
demeureraient encore immaculés. Et d’espérer une vogue de retraites 
dans une éternité sans foi, une prise d’habit dans le néant, un Ordre 
affranchi des mystères, et dont nul « frère » ne se réclamerait de rien, 
dédaignant son salut comme celui des autres, un Ordre de l’impossible 
salut… (O 722) 
 
As for us others, we need cloisters that are just as dispossessed and as 
empty as our souls, to lose ourselves there without the assistance of 
the heavens, and in a purity of the absent ideal, cloisters made for 
disabused angels who, in their fall, by means of vanquished illusions, 
remained immaculate. And to hope for a vogue of retreats in an 
eternity without faith, a taking of the religious habit in nothingness, an 
Order freed from mysteries, and from which no “brother” would ask 
for anything, disdaining his salvation as he disdains that of others, an 
Order of the Impossible Salvation… 
 
The rhythm of monastic life is, in part, an attempt to replace linear time with 
a cyclic conception of time that more closely approximates the 
changelessness of eternity as opposed to our own constantly fluctuating 
world. Here Cioran not only adapts traditional monastic contemplation to his 
own new vision of eternity as impossible salvation, he also reverses the 
notion of the fall; for him, the fall of the angels is not the source of our 
damnation but rather of the ability to transcend illusion, and most notably, in 
this context, the illusion of the possibility of salvation. The attempt to cancel 
linear time is also an effort to cancel the fall itself, since the fall is for Cioran 
a fall into time, as one of his book titles indicates.3 To vanquish linear time is 
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also to triumph over one of the most problematic illusions of modernity, that 
of progress. For Cioran, the terms were synonyms in the nineteenth century.4  
It is worth pausing a moment over the relationship of earthly progress 
to Cioran’s innovative conception of the fall. It is not so much acting on the 
desire for knowledge as a broader conception of any action that results in our 
perdition: 
 
L’homme n’aurait pas dû se vouer à l’acte mais se plonger dans la 
passivité, ne rien changer au néant établi, commencer et finir par un 
détachement non pareil. L’histoire est un péché. Son péché. Ceux qui 
idolâtrent l’avenir sont solidaires de ces héritiers d’Adam, dont la 
superbe s’est révélée source de ruine. Le Siècle des Lumières a rejeté 
l’idée de chute, de mal originel; d’où son caractère brillant et 
l’attraction qu’il exerce sur des esprits à la fois subtils et naïfs. (Cioran 
“Face” 195)5 
 
Man should not have given himself to the act but should plunge into 
passivity, change nothing in the given nothingness, begin and end by 
an unrivaled detachment. History is a sin. Its sin. Those who idolize 
the future are in solidarity with those inheritors of Adam, whose 
arrogance revealed itself as a source of ruin. The Enlightenment 
rejected the idea of the fall, of original evil; from there comes its 
shining character and the attraction it exercises over spirits that are at 
once subtle and naïve.  
 
Rather than seeing the Enlightenment as a triumph over ignorance, a 
promethean attempt to liberate humanity from fears relating to the unknown, 
Cioran sees it as advancing us further in the direction of the fall, but not for 
the traditional theological reasons that relate the fall to the human sin of 
pride. In fact, he writes elsewhere that it is not this disobedience of Adam 
and Eve but rather the Christian notion of the Incarnation that represents the 
most exaggerated expression of hubris by overestimating the importance of 
human beings in the world: 
 
L’Incarnation est la flatterie la plus dangereuse dont nous ayons été 
l’objet. Elle nous aura dispensé un statut démesuré, hors de proportion 
avec ce que nous sommes. En haussant l’anecdote humaine à la dignité de 
drame cosmique, le christianisme nous a trompés sur notre insignifiance, il 
nous a précipités dans l’illusion, dans cet optimisme morbide qui, au 
mépris de l’évidence, confond cheminement et apothéose. Plus réfléchie, 
l’Antiquité païenne mettait l’homme à sa place.  (O 1188) 
4




The Incarnation is the most dangerous flattery of which we have been the 
object. It will supposedly have given us an inordinate status, out of all 
proportion with what we are. By raising the human anecdote to the dignity 
of a cosmic drama, Christianity duped us about our insignificance, it 
brought us into illusion, into that morbid optimism which, in contempt of 
the evidence, confuses progression with apotheosis. Better thought out, 
pagan Antiquity put man in his place. 
 
Instead of making a theological argument about knowledge, Cioran argues, 
rather pragmatically, that knowledge simply cannot lead to happiness; 
therefore the notion of progress is null and void to any except those who are 
too naïve to see that this is so. While he largely abandons traditional 
theological explanations, in this case, as in so many others in his work, there 
is still an echo of traditional theology in this explanation of the myth of 
progress: 
 
Tout pas en avant, toute forme de dynamisme comporte quelque chose de 
satanique: le « progrès » est l'équivalent moderne de la Chute, la version 
profane de la damnation. Et ceux qui y croient et en sont les promoteurs, 
nous tous en définitive, que sommes-nous sinon des réprouvés en marche, 
prédestinés à l’immonde, à ces machines, à ces villes, dont seul un 
désastre exhaustif pourrait nous débarrasser. Ce serait là pour nos 
inventions l’occasion ou jamais de prouver leur utilité et de se réhabiliter à 
nos yeux.  (O 1087)  
 
Every step forward, every form of dynamism consists of something 
satanic: “progress” is the modern equivalent of the Fall, the secular 
version of damnation. And those who believe in and promote it, 
definitively all of us, what are we if not outcasts on the move, predestined 
to the squalid, to those machines, those cities, of which only an exhaustive 
disaster could rid us. That would be the one chance for our inventions to 
prove their usefulness and to rehabilitate themselves in our eyes.  
   
Here Cioran adds a key element to his conception of anti-progress, that is, the fact 
that we are predisposed to retain a conception of hope and therefore of progress; it 
is difficult for most of us to sustain thinking and acting in a way that negates those 
concepts. If anything could save us from this inherent “fault,” it would be lucidity, 
but here we fall back into the paradox that lucidity in no way brings about 
salvation; it only serves to remind us, as we shall see below, that the ideal for 
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humanity would be to abandon most everything that typically defines the human, 
including action first and foremost, and to strive to imitate plant life. 
 At this point it would be tempting to affirm that no salvation is possible 
for Cioran, that, for all of the reasons just outlined, he only invokes the word to 
confirm its impossibility or to refer to the way the concept functioned historically. 
But this would be misleading, since Cioran often does speak of salvation as 
attainable. Our next task is thus to examine the many routes that Cioran affirms, at 
one time or another, as providing salvation. The first of these is suicide. He 
affirms in Le mauvais démiurge that 
 
la mort n’est pas nécessairement ressentie comme délivrance ; le suicide 
délivre toujours: il est summum, il est paroxysme de salut. On devrait par 
décence choisir soi-même le moment de disparaître. Il est avilissant de 
s’éteindre comme on s’éteint, il est intolérable d’être exposé à une fin sur 
laquelle on ne peut rien, qui vous guette, vous abat, vous précipite dans 
l’innommable.  (O 1205) 
 
death is not necessarily felt to be a deliverance; suicide always delivers: it 
is a summum, the paroxysm of salvation. One should, by decency, choose 
oneself the moment to disappear. It is degrading to die the way people do, 
it is intolerable to be exposed to an end against which one is powerless, 
which lies in wait for you, slays you, pushes you headlong into the 
unnameable. 
 
While this affirmation seems categorical, one does not have to look far to find its 
refutation. We read just a few pages further: “Que l’on se supprime ou non, tout 
demeure inchangé. Mais la décision de se supprimer paraît à chacun la plus 
importante qui ait jamais été prise. Cela ne devrait pas être ainsi. Et pourtant cela 
est, et rien ne pourra prévaloir contre cette aberration ou ce mystère” (1208-9) 
‘Whether one kills oneself or not, everything remains unchanged. But the decision 
to kill oneself seems to each person to be the most important one that was ever 
made. This should not be so. And yet it is, and nothing will be able to prevail 
against this aberration or this mystery.’ This is much more consistent with 
Cioran’s other remarks on suicide and with what we have established above—
namely, that since any kind of action is fruitless and, worse, leads in fact to our 
perdition, suicide, which is itself an action, cannot ultimately be our salvation.6 
 Looking elsewhere for potential sources of salvation in Cioran, we might 
be tempted to find it in music, which is a constant source of emotional transport 
for him and a potential release from unrelenting pessimism. As Nicole Parfait has 
noted, music was consistently, from Cioran’s earliest writings, even a source of 
what Parfait categorizes as salvation: 
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C’est d’abord dans la musique que [Cioran] croit trouver un espoir de 
salut. “Elle seule, affirme Cioran, peut nous détourner des finalités de la 
vie”: ce faisant, “elle nous en délivre, en ce qu’elle nous fait l’oublier” (Le 
livre des leurres). D’où vient ce pouvoir? C’est que la musique touche une 
zone plus profonde que la conscience: l’univers des sens, où règne 
l’immédiateté des impressions. Elle transforme le corps en un champ 
réceptif immatériel, abolissant tant ses limites physiques que ses besoins et 
ses souffrances. Réduisant la dualité, elle masque l’activité réflexive de la 
conscience, laissant le champ libre aux sensations.  (Parfait 58-59) 
 
It is at first in music that [Cioran] believes he finds a hope of salvation. “It 
alone,” Cioran affirms, “can turn us away from the finalities of life”: in 
doing so, “it delivers us from it, by making us forget it” (“The Book of 
Traps”). Where does this power come from? It’s that music touches a 
deeper zone than consciousness: the universe of the senses, where an 
immediacy of impressions reigns. It transforms the body into an 
immaterial receptive field, abolishing its physical limits as much as its 
needs and its sufferings. Reducing duality, it masks the reflexive activity 
of consciousness, leaving the field free for sensations. 
  
Given music’s liberating power, Cioran fears that a time will come when we will 
no longer be moved by it: “Quand la musique même est impuissante à nous 
sauver, un poignard brille dans nos yeux; plus rien ne nous soutient, si ce n’est la 
fascination du crime” (O 799) ‘When music itself is powerless to save us, a 
dagger shines in our eyes; nothing supports us anymore, except the fascination of 
the crime.’ The word sauver ‘to save’ appears here, to be sure, but it does not 
appear to carry its full metaphysical import as it does in so many other instances 
in Cioran’s writings. This seems to be one of the few instances when he uses the 
word in a quasi-metaphorical sense, meaning perhaps that music temporarily dulls 
our senses or forestalls lucidity. That kind of illusion, however, could never count 
as salvation in the full meaning of the term.  
Cioran also implies at one moment in Le mauvais démiurge that 
skepticism itself is a form of salvation:  
 
Je conserve un fond de scepticisme que rien jamais ne pourra entamer et 
auquel je reviens toujours après chacun de mes emballements. Que ce 
scepticisme soit congénital ou acquis, il ne m’en apparaît pas moins 
comme une certitude, voire comme une libération, quand toute autre forme 
de salut s’estompe ou me rejette.  (O 1249) 
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I keep a background of skepticism that nothing will ever be able to cut into 
and to which I always come back after each one of my flights of 
enthusiasm. Whether this skepticism be congenital or acquired, it appears 
no less to me as a certainty, even as a liberation, when any other form of 
salvation dims or rejects me. 
 
Here skepticism would align itself with lucidity, thus avoiding the problem of 
illusion that was inherent in seeing music as salvation. Cioran implies that other 
forms of salvation are deficient because they are not consistently applicable. It is 
interesting to note that he says not that he rejects salvation, but that it rejects him. 
But when pushed to its limit, Cioran implies at other points, skepticism leads to 
yet another paradox, namely our being able to see that we do not in fact need to be 
saved. Thus salvation would come, via skepticism about salvation, from our being 
able to free ourselves from thinking about salvation to begin with: “Quand on a 
compris que rien n’est, que les choses ne méritent même pas le statut 
d’apparences, on n’a plus besoin d’être sauvé, on est sauvé, et malheureux à 
jamais” (O 1210) ‘When one has understood that nothing is, that things do not 
even merit the status of appearances, one no longer needs to be saved, one is 
saved, and miserable forever.’ Salvation is thus simultaneously granted and 
devalued. We shall see below, however, that this too is only a provisional and not 
entirely satisfactory answer to the problem of salvation, since we are not able, 
according to Cioran, to accept truly and permanently the kind of salvific nihilism 
he proposes here.  
Living requires the kinds of illusions that block our ability truly to 
conceive that nothing really exists. By definition for Cioran, what we call “life” 
depends on illusion: “Et comme [l’homme] avance en vertu de l'illusion acquise, 
pour s’arrêter il faudrait que l’illusion s’effritât et disparût ; mais elle est 
indestructible tant qu’il demeure complice du temps” (O 1083) ‘And as [man] 
advances by virtue of his acquired illusion, to stop it would be necessary for the 
illusion to evaporate and disappear; but it is indestructible as long as it remains 
complicit with time.’ All of this comes round once again to the notion of the fall, 
specifically the fall into time, from which there can be no release. And so we 
continue to fall both into time and into religious conceptions even though we 
know them to be illusions, thus guaranteeing that we can never be saved by 
refusing to maintain the importance of being saved in the first place. Haunted by 
religious thought and religious vocabulary, Cioran’s own writing voice is an 
example of this inability to get beyond religious thinking. The vestiges of 
religious thinking in his writing are some of the illusions beyond which we find it 
hard to think and live for a sustained period of time; the atheist is no less 
delusional than the believer, since both require fictions to sustain life: 
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Nous durons tant que durent nos fictions. … Exister équivaut à un acte de 
foi, à une protestation contre la vérité, à une prière interminable…Dès lors 
qu’ils consentent à vivre, l’incrédule et le dévot se ressemblent en 
profondeur, puisque l’un et autre ont pris la seule décision qui marque un 
être.  (O 969) 
 
We last as long as our fictions last. … Existing equals an act of faith, a 
protest against the truth, an interminable prayer…As soon as they consent 
to live, the faithless person and the devout one resemble each other deeply, 
since both have made the only decision that marks a being. 
 
And so, if living means believing in fiction, then making the affirmation that we 
are saved when we understand that nothing is, would involve renouncing the very 
skepticism that led us here, since, as Cioran writes in De l’inconvénient d’être né 
(The Trouble with Being Born): “La certitude qu’il n’y a pas de salut est une 
forme de salut, elle est même le salut. À partir de là on peut aussi bien organiser 
sa propre vie que construire une philosophie de l’histoire” (O 1390) ‘The certainty 
that there is no salvation is a form of salvation, it even is salvation. From there 
one can organize one’s own life as well as constructing a philosophy of history.’ 
To be able to follow these lines of thinking simultaneously, we would need to 
adopt both absolute skepticism and absolute certainty. This would be salvation, 
but here, once again, its conditions of existence are shown to be logically 
impossible. 
 Given that an acknowledgment of the nullity of existence, along with a 
concurrent reduction in all of the faculties typically associated with human nature, 
are what would bring us closest to something like salvation, it is not surprising 
that Cioran affirms the value of sleep as a potential relief from the suffering that 
characterizes existence: 
 
N’importe qui se sauve par le sommeil, n’importe qui a du génie en 
dormant: point de différence entre les rêves d’un boucher et ceux d’un 
poète. Mais notre clairvoyance ne saurait tolérer qu’une telle merveille 
dure, ni que l’inspiration soit mise à la portée de tous: le jour nous retire 
les dons que la nuit nous dispense. Le fou seul possède le privilège de 
passer sans heurt de l’existence nocturne l’existence diurne: aucune 
distinction entre ses rêves et ses veilles. Il a renoncé à notre raison, comme 
le clochard à nos biens. Tous deux ont trouvé la voie qui mène hors de la 
souffrance et résolu tous nos problèmes ; aussi demeurent-ils des modèles 
que nous ne pouvons suivre des sauveurs sans adeptes.  (O 826-27)  
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Anybody can save himself by sleep, anybody is a genius while sleeping: 
no difference at all between the dreams of a butcher and those of a poet. 
But our clearsightedness would not tolerate such a wonder’s lasting, nor 
that inspiration be within everyone’s grasp: daytime takes back the gifts 
that the night provides. Only the crazy person possesses the privilege to 
pass smoothly from nocturnal to diurnal existence: no distinction between 
his dreaming and his waking. He has renounced our reason, as the 
homeless person has renounced our goods. Both have found the way that 
leads out of suffering and resolved all our problems; thus they remain 
models of saviors that we can follow without followers. 
 
From this it emerges that salvation is absolutely individual—since a person 
cannot follow someone else into insanity—as well as involuntary, and thus 
impossible by sheer act of will alone, not to mention undesirable for us as long as 
we cling to such inherently human tendencies as to believe that being sane is 
preferable to being insane. Still, sleep provides at least temporary or provisional 
salvation, since in sleep we have a taste of what the unconscious void is like. 
Sleep is the state that most resembles another of Cioran’s announced ideals, that 
of being a plant: “Plantes et bêtes portent sur elles les marques du salut, comme 
l’homme celles de la perdition” (O 1437) ‘Plants and animals carry the mark of 
salvation, as man carry those of perdition.’ Once again, the fall into time is related 
to our permanent damnation on account of the fact that we are perpetually 
changing, not just in the sense of growing older, which we share with the animals, 
but in our ability to imagine the future and thus imagine humanity differently: 
“Sans aller chercher dans les égouts des recettes de sagesse, comment ne pas 
reconnaître les avantages qu’a sur nous un rat, justement parce qu’il est rat et rien 
d’autre ? Toujours différents, nous ne sommes nous-mêmes que dans la mesure 
où nous nous écartons de notre définition” (O 1078) ‘Without going looking for 
recipes of wisdom in the sewers, how can we not recognize the advantages that a 
rat has on us, precisely because he is a rat and nothing else? Always different, we 
are only ourselves to the extent that we distance ourselves from our definition.’ 
But what, then, of the act of creation itself? If sleep brings us a step closer to 
animal consciousness, then our active building and creating brings us nearer to 
God’s work. Predictably, movement closer to God is not positively valued in 
Cioran: “De quoi sommes-nous coupables, sinon d’avoir suivi, plus ou moins 
servilement, l’exemple du créateur ?” (O 1170) ‘Of what are we guilty, if not of 
having followed, in a more or less servile way, the example of the creator?’ 
Cioran condemns parenthood by the same logic: “Cette incapacité de demeurer en 
soi-même, dont le créateur devait faire une si fâcheuse démonstration, nous en 
avons tous hérité: engendrer c’est continuer d’une autre façon et à une autre 
échelle l’entreprise qui porte son nom, c’est, par une déplorable singerie, ajouter à 
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sa « création »” (O 1174) ‘This incapacity to stay in oneself, of which the creator 
had to make such a regrettable demonstration, we have all inherited it: to have 
children is to continue by another means and on another scale the enterprise that 
bears his name, it is, by a deplorable act of clowning, to add to his ‘creation.’’ But 
we are in far more complex territory once we talk not about human creation in 
general but about artistic creation specifically, and more precisely still, about the 
act of writing, which will be the final potential route to salvation that we shall 
consider. In a sense, Cioran’s comments on the subject follow the same general 
trajectory that we saw operating in the case of salvation itself, namely, he at times 
provides the blanket condemnation of the idea that one would expect, yet that 
condemnation is nuanced and even called completely into question by many of his 
other writings.  
 An eminently human activity, writing is by its nature associated with the 
fall and with original sin according to Cioran: 
 
Ecrire des livres n’est pas sans avoir quelque rapport avec le péché 
originel. Car qu’est-ce qu’un livre sinon une perte d’innocence, un acte 
d’agression, une répétition de notre chute ? Publier ses tares pour amuser 
ou exaspérer ! Une barbarie à l’égard de notre intimité, une profanation, 
une souillure. Et une tentation. Je vous en parle en connaissance de cause.  
(O 881) 
 
Writing books is not without some relationship to original sin. For what is 
a book if not a loss of innocence, an act of aggression, a repetition of our 
fall? Publishing one’s defects in order to amuse or exasperate! An act of 
barbarism toward our intimacy, a profanation, a sullying. And a 
temptation. I speak from personal experience. 
 
Writing, on this account, draws us ever deeper into original sin rather than 
providing a way out of it, which is consistent with Cioran’s appraisal of all 
particularly human pursuits. Like living itself, writing requires a large dose of 
illusion in order to sustain itself: 
 
Produire, « créer », c’est s’interdire la clairvoyance, c’est avoir le courage 
ou le bonheur de ne pas percevoir le mensonge de la diversité, le caractère 
trompeur du multiple. Une œuvre n’est réalisable que si nous nous 
aveuglons sur les apparences ; dès que nous cessons de leur attribuer une 
dimension métaphysique, nous perdons tous nos moyens.  (O 1142)  
 
To produce, to “create,” is to forbid oneself clearsightedness, it is to have 
the courage or the happiness to not notice the lie of diversity, the 
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deceiving character of the multiple. A work is only achievable if we blind 
ourselves to appearances; as soon as we cease to attribute a metaphysical 
dimension to them, we lose all our means. 
  
But here a very different note emerges in the words “courage” and “happiness.” 
Unlike other proposed sources of salvation, which ultimately draw us ever deeper 
into perdition, writing seems to hold out hope for something more. If it requires 
just as much delusion about our condition as the other solutions, the difference 
seems to be the lucidity which the writer  brings to the delusion that leads to the 
possibility of writing.7 The delusion is controlled by the writer, rather than 
encroaching upon him or her unwittingly. Writing thereby becomes a means of 
confronting, even if not vanquishing, the illusions inherent in human life, and 
therefore requires courage temporarily to enter those illusions so as better to 
illuminate and give voice to them. This is, perhaps, the appropriate degree of 
involvement in the human condition, this act of giving voice to it without drawing 
the full consequences of that condition: “Ne tirent les dernières conséquences que 
ceux qui vivent hors de l’art. Le suicide, la sainteté, le vice—autant de formes du 
manque de talent. ... C’est une diminution salutaire qui fait de tout acte de 
création un facteur de fuite” (O 626) ‘Only those who live outside of art draw the 
last consequences. Suicide, holiness, vice—so many forms of lack of talent. … 
It’s a saving diminution that makes of each act of creation a factor of evasion.’ 
Passing into action to any greater extent than writing would be to fall into the 
same trap we explored above, that of not cancelling but merely adding to the fall 
of humanity by seeking to overcome it through an action like suicide, which, by 
permanently suspending existence, permanently cancels lucidity without having  
changed the fallen human condition at all. 
 Suicide is an act of negation whereas writing is not. Cioran exempts the 
poet and writer from his condemnation of action, and, in his middle and late work, 
does not hesitate to use the vocabulary of salvation when describing their task: 
 
Le poète, lui, … prend le langage au sérieux. Il s’en crée un à sa façon. 
Toutes ses singularités procèdent de son intolérance aux mots tels quels. 
Inapte à en supporter la banalité et l’usure, il est prédestiné à souffrir à 
cause d’eux et pour eux ; et cependant c’est par eux qu’il essaie de se 
sauver, c’est de leur régénération qu’il attend son salut. Quelque grinçante 
que soit sa vision des choses, il n’est jamais un vrai négateur. (O 944) 
 
The poet … takes language seriously. He creates himself one in his own 
manner. All his singularities proceed from his intolerance of words as they 
are. Incapable of tolerating the banality and wear of them, he is 
predestined to suffer because of them and for them; and yet it is by them 
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that he attempts to save himself, it is from their regeneration that he awaits 
his salvation. No matter how grating his vision of things may be, he is 
never a true negator. 
 
The poet is cast here in the role of the hero, predestined to suffer in the persistent 
attempt to procure the only kind of salvation that may be possible, that is, an 
individual’s own salvation by him or herself. By continuing to engage in work 
that is certain to produce suffering, the poet engages most fully with life, which is 
equivalent to suffering for Cioran. But the creative act, when applied to words, 
escapes the condemnation of action that Cioran applies almost universally 
elsewhere. Writing situates itself halfway between the continuation of illusion and 
the working through of lucidity; it is neither one in any complete sense and 
participates simultaneously in both. It is the kind of paradoxical act that can 
respond to the series of paradoxes that Cioran’s tortured thinking about salvation 
has generated at every turn.8 Even though the poet can save only him or herself, 
we are nonetheless invited to follow him or her: 
 
Puisque le poète est un monstre qui tente son salut par le mot, et qu’il 
supplée au vide de l’univers par le symbole même du vide (car le mot est-
il autre chose ?), pourquoi ne le suivrions-nous pas dans son 
exceptionnelle illusion ? Il devient notre recours toutes les fois que nous 
désertons les fictions du langage courant pour nous en chercher d’autres, 
insolites, sinon rigoureuses. Ne semble-t-il pas alors que toute autre 
irréalité est préférable à la nôtre, et qu’il y a plus de substance dans un 
vers que dans tous ces mots trivialisés par nos conversations ou nos 
prières ? Que la poésie doive être accessible ou hermétique, efficace ou 
gratuite, c’est là un problème secondaire. Exercice ou révélation, 
qu’importe. Nous lui demandons, nous autres, qu’elle nous délivre de 
l’oppression, des affres du discours. Si elle y réussit, elle fait, pour un 
instant, notre salut. (O 944-5)  
 
Since the poet is a monster who attempts his salvation by the word, and 
since he replaces the void of the universe with the very symbol of the void 
(for is the word anything else than that?), why would we not follow him in 
his exceptional illusion? He becomes our recourse every time that we 
desert our fictions of ordinary language in order to seek others, unusual, if 
not rigorous. Does it not seem then that all other unreality is preferable to 
ours, and that there is more substance in a line of poetry than in all those 
words trivialized by our conversations or our prayers? That our poetry 
must be accessible or hermetic, effective or gratuitous is a secondary 
problem. Exercise or revelation, what does it matter? We ask of it, we 
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others, that it deliver us from oppression, from the torments of discourse. 
If it succeeds, it makes, for an instant, our salvation.  
 
Poetry’s illusions are not, then, illusions like any other. The fact that we seek 
them in full cognizance of their status as illusions allows us to draw a benefit 
from them that Cioran does not hesitate to label “deliverance.”  
 Is this not, however, too easy a solution to a problem whose complexity 
Cioran has underscored throughout all the writings we have quoted? One would 
be tempted to think so, especially when reading this passage in conjunction with 
others in which he poses a simple equivalence between writing and suicide, 
claiming that the act of writing is a soulagement ‘relief,’ a way of exteriorizing 
the self, without which he would have killed himself.9 But the key aspect of this 
solution, which does not allow for salvation by a simple substitution of one kind 
of illusion for another, is at the end of the passage quoted above, highlighted in 
Cioran’s own italics: poetry becomes for an instant our salvation. By abandoning 
the notion of permanence, we are able to achieve a very temporary form of 
salvation which is in constant need of renewal. Since we are condemned to exist 
in time, and since changeless eternity is impossible, humanity’s constant falling 
can only be lessened by constant renewal of salvation, the time of voluntary 
suspension of illusion through writing. From this constantly renewed salvation 
stems the cyclic nature of Cioran’s own writings, which, often refusing linear 
development, turn around the same sets of ideas from aphorism to aphorism and 
from book to book. Cioran himself links his obsessional rewriting of key ideas to 
a notion of writing as therapy: “Si je n'ai fait qu’écrire le même livre, en marge 
des mêmes obsessions, c’est pour avoir constaté que cela me libérait, en quelque 
sorte. J’ai vraiment écrit par nécessité. La littérature, la philosophie, que sais-je 
encore, ne furent pour moi qu’un prétexte. L’acte d’écrire comme thérapeutique, 
c’était cela l’essentiel” (Liiceanu 85) ‘If I have only written the same book [over 
and over again], in the margins of the same obsessions, it is because I noticed that 
it liberated me in some way. I truly wrote by necessity. Literature, philosophy, or 
whatever, were only a pretext for me. The act of writing as therapeutic, that was 
the essential thing.’ Here Cioran’s theology aligns itself perfectly with his attitude 
on writing: he explicitly affirms both a provisional theological salvation and the 
momentary personal salvation available to us through poetry that he affirmed in 
the passage quoted above: 
 
Tel théologien, dans sa scandaleuse naïveté, croit à la rédemption tout en 
niant le péché originel ; mais si le péché n’est pas consubstantiel à 
l’humanité, quel sens attribuer à l’avènement du rédempteur, qu’est-ce 
qu’il [est] venu rédimer ? Aucunement accidentelle, notre corruption est 
permanente, elle est de toujours. De même l’iniquité: … elle est même ce 
14
Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 38, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 2
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol38/iss1/2
DOI: 10.4148/2334-4415.1027
qu’il y a de plus visible ici-bas, où remettre les choses en place exigerait 
un sauveur pour chaque génération, pour chaque individu plutôt.  (O 1225) 
 
Some theologian, in his scandalous naiveté, believes in redemption while 
denying original sin; but if sin is not consubstantial with humanity, what 
meaning can we attribute to the coming of the redeemer, what has he come 
to redeem? Not at all accidental, our corruption is permanent and has been 
there from the start. The same with iniquity: … it is even what is most 
visible here below, where putting things back in place would demand a 
savior for each generation, or rather for each individual. 
 
This individual saviour, which, as we have seen, is in fact each person for him or 
herself, is also a provisional saviour. Cioran remarks a few pages further on: 
 
Dans la décision de renoncer au salut, il n’entre aucun élément diabolique, 
car, s’il en était ainsi, d’où viendrait la sérénité qui accompagne cette 
décision ? Rien de diabolique ne rend serein. Dans les parages du Démon, 
on est au contraire morose. C’est mon cas… Aussi ma sérénité est-elle de 
courte durée: juste le temps de me décider à en finir avec le salut. Par 
bonheur je m’y décide souvent, et, chaque fois, quelle paix!  (O 1251)  
 
No diabolical element enters into the decision to renounce salvation, for, if 
it were thus, from whence would come the serenity that accompanies this 
decision? Nothing diabolical renders one serene. In the vicinity of the 
Demon, one is, on the contrary, morose. That’s my case… Therefore my 
serenity is short-lasting: just the time to make up my mind to be done with 
salvation. Happily I decide that often, and, each time, what peace! 
 
And so both the need for salvation and the constantly renewable decision to 
renounce salvation are temporary and provisional. Serenity is not impossible for 
Cioran; it comes both through writing and through the conscious decision to 
renounce salvation, and perhaps the two acts function interdependently.10 But the 
essential point is that serenity comes only with the realization that there can be no 
permanent salvation, and that, while it is in constant need of renewal, it is, all the 
same, perpetually renewable by a further act of writing or a renewed commitment 
to renounce the need for salvation in the first place. 
A number of commentators on Cioran have focused on the role of writing. 
Rachel Mutin has emphasized the palliative aspect that, as we have seen above, 
Cioran himself sometimes evokes. Mutin writes: 
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Geste cathartique permettant de canaliser ses angoisses, ses rages, ses 
hantises et ses obsessions, le fait d’écrire fut donc pour Cioran un moyen 
de se délivrer, de « s’expurger » d’un débordement intérieur quasi 
insupportable. … Ainsi, c’est très probablement dans l’écriture que Cioran 
trouva une résolution palliative …, celle d’un retrait nostalgique envisagé 
à la fin de sa vie: en revenir à une sorte de monde cynique, parvenir à une 
somptueuse décadence.  (Mutin 240) 
 
A cathartic gesture which permits him to channel his anguishes, his rages, 
his hauntings and obsessions, the fact of writing was thus for Cioran a 
means of delivering himself, of “purging” himself of a nearly intolerable 
interior overflowing. … Thus, it is very probably in writing that Cioran 
found a palliative resolution …, that of a nostalgic retreat imagined at the 
end of his life: to come back to a sort of cynical world, to arrive at a 
sumptuous decadence. 
 
Even in this emphasis on the therapeutic value of writing, Mutin appeals to the 
vocabulary of redemption to describe the effect of writing, which leads us to 
suspect that there is more to the role of writing in Cioran, despite what he himself 
occasionally affirms, than a simple pharmaceutical aspect, a pure descent into 
illusion. Other critics have emphasized the theological dimension of writing, its 
characterization as a fall and thus concomitant with our fall into time and into the 
degraded state which is the only possible human existence: 
 
Cioran ne se pardonne pas de continuer à écrire. Seul le silence est grand. 
Il est de la race de ceux qui ne l’ignorant point, ne peuvent pour autant 
renoncer à la parole, à l’écriture surtout. Cioran le désespéré est un homme 
de lettres. Contradiction à laquelle il fut sensible. Occasion nouvelle de se 
moquer de lui-même avec un ricanement non tout à fait dépourvu de 
complaisance.  (Mauriac 215) 
 
Cioran does not forgive himself for continuing to write. Only silence is 
grand. He is of the race of those who, well aware of that, cannot for all 
that renounce the word, and the written word especially. Cioran the 
hopeless is a man of letters, a contradiction to which he was sensitive. A 
new occasion to mock himself with a snicker that is not without 
indulgence.  
 
Claude Mauriac’s descriptive vocabulary accurately reflects the relation between 
writing and the fall. If, as we have seen, Cioran refuses to assign a diabolical 
motive to the decision to renounce salvation, there is something that relates 
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writing to our fallen condition. Condemned to language just as we are condemned 
to exist in time, unable thus to perpetuate silence, the palliative measure which is 
writing is also a sign of our further falling. As Mauriac emphasizes, however, 
Cioran is himself conscious of the fall, which to some extent mitigates its effects, 
allowing a kind of lucidity-in-illusion through ironic detachment.11 Cioran in fact 
claims that condensing language into aphorisms is a way of taming language’s 
inevitable expansion: 
 
Il est plus aisé de renoncer au pain qu’au verbe. Malheureusement le verbe 
glisse au verbiage, à la littérature. Même la pensée y tend, toujours prête à 
se répandre, à s’enfler ; l’arrêter par la pointe, la contracter en aphorisme 
ou en boutade, c’est s’opposer à son expansion, à son mouvement naturel, 
à son élan vers le délayage, ver l’inflation .... Vous dirai-je le fond de ma 
pensée ? Tout mot est un mot de trop. Il s’agit pourtant d’écrire: 
écrivons…, dupons-nous les uns les autres.  (O 882) 
 
It is easier to renounce bread than the word. Unfortunately the word slides 
into verbiage, into literature. Even thought tends towards that, always 
ready to spread itself out, to puff itself out; to stop it at the stinging point, 
to contract it into an aphorism or a witty saying, is to oppose its expansion, 
its natural movement, its movement toward padding out and inflation …. 
Shall I tell you the depth of my thought? Every word is one word too 
many. The thing is to write though: let us write…, let us dupe each other. 
 
Even though we are forever condemned, this does not cancel all interest in life, as 
Mauriac’s phrase “a parcel of attachment” aptly conveys. We get the sense that it 
is not simply, as Cioran sometimes postulates, that an inability permanently to 
renounce life is a mark of our complicity with the fall, but rather an affirmation, 
however provisional, temporary, and always open to skeptical interrogation, that 
writing can and does form a real attachment to life and allows us to take some 
degree of momentary but deep pleasure from it. 
 Here it is important to make a distinction between pessimism and nihilism, 
for while Cioran may sometimes be considered a nihilist, and while many of the 
assertions we have quoted would give partial credence to this view in that he 
repeatedly affirms that nothing would be better than something, nonexistence 
better than existence, the role that writing plays for Cioran would suggest that 
pessimism is a more helpful perspective through which to consider his writings. 
In his insightful book on pessimism, which argues, in sympathy with Cioran, that 
pessimism arises as a reaction to modern linear notions of time and its 
implications about progress, Joshua Foa Dienstag characterizes the difference this 
way: “Pessimism expects nothing. But this is not nihilism. Nihilism would be not 
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wanting anything. Extreme nihilism? Wanting nothing” (Dienstag 256). In other 
words, pessimism provides a potential art of living, fully lucid about the 
“dissonance and disorder” of the world (Dienstag xii) and therefore able to find 
joy by tempering expectations.12 It is not prohibited for the pessimist, as it would 
be for the nihilist, to believe that something may, at least temporarily, make life 
worth living. Cioran’s earliest readers in French already saw this attitude 
emerging through his brutally pessimistic prose. Maurice Nadeau’s review of 
Précis de decomposition, originally published in Combat in 1949, notes that 
Cioran’s act of writing removes him from nihilism: 
 
Sur le bord de la voie triomphale qui mène à la destruction atomique il 
pose le sac et s’assied, fourbu, refusant toutes les consolations et toutes les 
pitiés. 
Il croit encore à quelque chose puisqu’il écrit, se confesse et chante 
sa détresse. Parce qu’il la module dans une langue d’autant plus admirable 
qu’elle est d’emprunt, parce qu’il la distribue artistement en périodes 
lyriques, les unes facilement oratoires, les autres d’une concision à la 
Nietzsche ou à la Pascal, aurons-nous le front de dire que cette détresse est 
feinte?  (Nadeau 212) 
 
On the side of the triumphal way that leads to atomic destruction he puts 
down his bag and sits, exhausted, refusing all consolations and all pity. 
 He still believes in something since he writes, confesses, and sings 
his distress. Because he modulates it in a language that is all the more 
admirable since it is a borrowed one, because he distributes it artistically 
in lyrical phrasings, some easily oratorical, others of a concision like that 
of Nietzsche or Pascal, will we have the effrontery to say that this distress 
is feigned? 
  
While it cannot redeem us eternally, and while it may not even hold up to 
skeptical inquiry, writing remains for Cioran as necessary as living; he called it, in 
his last published book, a “defensible illusion.”13 Writing is never innocent, nor 
are the subjects of its pronouncements fixed or permanent; they are, rather, always 
subject to revision or even to perpetual restatement of the same. But lucidity about 
what writing can or cannot do as therapy, theology, or art of living, while it is not 
a definitive mode of salvation, is at least the beginning of the way to talk about it 
in terms that respect and reflect the full complexity of the idea. 
 To sum up, then, the role that salvation plays in Cioran distinguishes his 
writings from others’ by its fundamental ambiguity that refuses to resolve itself 
into an affirmation or rejection of the notion. While he considers many potential 
routes to salvation, including music, suicide, silence, and skepticism, all of these 
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turn out to be provisional modes of salvation at best, and the notion of redemption 
continues to haunt Cioran. While he refuses what we could label “belief,” his 
writing is nonetheless informed by and infused with the remnants of a theological 
discourse, a fact that makes it difficult to get beyond the notion of salvation, and 
all the more so when we consider that to find something like a permanent solution 
to the problem of salvation would divorce us from our human nature, bringing us 
closer to animal or even plant-like existence. Given our condemnation to remain 
within the human, writing offers the closest thing Cioran can find to a solution: it 
is provisional and temporary, yet eternally renewable when we find ourselves in 
defiance of our lucidity. If we are unable, even in a post-theological age, to get 
beyond our attachment to the concept of salvation, writing lucidly about that 




1. References to Cioran’s Œuvres will be designated in the text by the 
abbreviation O. All translations are my own. 
 
2. Pierre Nepveu comments on a fundamental paradox in Cioran: “Je ne peux pas 
vivre dans ce monde, je ne peux pas me résigner au temps ; mais je ne peux pas 
davantage en sortir. Paradoxe, fondateur, sans doute, mais presque trop facile, car 
on peut s’y installer comme dans une prison somme toute assez confortable, y 
tracer des beaux cercles et y cultiver à l’infini les fleurs d’un lyrisme plutôt 
décadent” (Nepveu 13-14) ‘I do not want to live in this world, I do not want to 
resign myself to time ; but nor can I leave it. As paradox that is no doubt 
fundamental, but almost too facile, since one can place oneself within it as in a 
prison that is all in all rather comfortable, and to trace beautiful circles there and 
cultivate on to infinity the flowers of a rather decadent lyricism.’  
3. For a detailed analysis of La chute dans le temps in conjunction with original 
sin, see David 149-175. 
 
4. “Tout le long du siècle dernier, progrès fut synonyme de salut” (Cioran, 
« Face » 194) ‘All throughout the last century, progress was synonymous 
with salvation.’ 
 
5. An important element of Cioran’s critique of progress is that good and evil are 
constant quantities in the universe; therefore progress is impossible insofar as it 
claims to diminish the amount of evil in the world: “Les modernes répugnent … à 
cette idée, spécifiquement antique, suivant laquelle les biens et les maux 
représentent une somme invariable, qui ne saurait subir aucune modification. 
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Avec notre hantise du progrès et de la régression, nous admettons implicitement 
que le mal change, soit qu’il diminue ou qu’il augmente. L’identité du monde 
avec lui-même, l’idée qu’il est condamné à être ce qu’il est, que l’avenir 
n’ajoutera rien d’essentiel aux données existantes, cette belle idée n’a plus cours ; 
c’est que justement, l’avenir, objet d’espoir ou d’horreur, est notre véritable lieu ; 
nous y vivons, il est tout pour nous” (O 1188) ‘Moderns find repugnant … this 
idea, specifically ancient, according to which goods and evils represent an 
invariable sum, which could not be modified. With our obsessive fear of progress 
and regression, we admit implicitly that evil changes, either it diminishes or 
augments. The identity of the world with itself, the idea that it is condemned to be 
what it is, that the future will not add anything essential to the existing givens, this 
idea no longer has currency; it is that the future, object of hope or horror, is our 
true place; we live there, it is everything for us.’  
 
6. Cioran often distinguishes the idea of suicide from the act; the latter is more 
fruitful: “Je ne vis que parce qu’il est en mon pouvoir de mourir quand bon me 
semblera: sans l’idée du suicide, je me serais tué depuis toujours” (O 775) ‘I only 
live because it is in my power to die whenever I want: without the idea of suicide, 
I would have killed myself forever ago.’ 
 
7. Patrice Bollon underscores the permanent coexistence of lucidity and delusion 
in Cioran, “l’exigence de la lucidité la plus éclairante et la nécessité de l’illusion 
la plus obscurantiste, la recherche de la sagesse et l’acquiéscement aux pulsions 
les plus viles, l’élan mystique vers la sainteté et l’attachement au matérialisme le 
plus athée … ! Comme si coexistaient en permanence en lui et à tout propos 
l’affirmateur et le négateur …” (Bollon 150) ‘the demand for the most 
illuminating lucidity and the necessity of the most obscuring illusion, the search 
for wisdom and the acquiescing to the most vile drives, the mystical yearning for 
saintliness and the attachment to the most materialist atheism …! As if the 
affirmer and the negator coexisted permanently and about every subject in him 
….’  
 
8. For an insightful reading of the way Cioran cultivates rather than refuses 
paradox, see David 85-106. 
 
9. “Parce que écrire, si peu que ce soit, m’a aidé à passer d'une année à l’autre, car 
les obsessions exprimées restent affaiblies et en partie surmontées. Je suis sûr que 
si je n’avais pas noirci du papier, je me serais tué depuis longtemps. Ecrire est un 
soulagement extraordinaire. Publier aussi. Cela vous paraîtra ridicule, et c’est 
pourtant très vrai. Car un livre est votre vie, ou une partie de votre vie, qui vous 
rend extérieur” (Entretiens 17) ‘Because writing, no matter how little, helped me 
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to pass from one year to another, for expressed obsessions remain weakened and 
in part overcome. I am sure that if I had not blackened some paper, I would have 
killed myself a long time ago. Writing is an extraordinary relief. Publishing too. 
That is going to seem ridiculous to you, and yet it’s very true. For a book is your 
life, or a part of your life, that renders you exterior.’  
 
10. One should perhaps add that the impermanence of salvation is also related to 
the impermanence of ideas in Cioran’s writing, which Edward Said identifies as a 
source of suffering: “Ce qui le fait particulièrement souffrir, pense-t-il, c’est son 
incapacité à « avoir lieu ». Comme le neveu de Rameau il voit le monde, et son 
écriture exprime donc une série de positions prises—mais seulement 
provisoirement. Il les abandonne ensuite car « le sens », déclare-t-il, « commence 
à dater ». Inéluctablement les difficultés qu’il rencontre le font revenir à une 
conscience de l’impasse de l’écriture elle-même” (Said 174) ‘What particularly 
makes him suffer, he thinks, is his incapacity to “take place.” Like Rameau’s 
nephew he sees the world, and his writing thus expresses a series of stances—but 
only provisionally taken. He then abandons them because “meaning,” he declares, 
“begins to make something seem dated.” Ineluctably the difficulties he encounters 
make him return to a consciousness of the impasse of writing itself.’ 
 
11. Sylvie Jaudeau calls this the lucidity of the “last man” in Cioran: “En une 
magistrale inversion, l’homme déchu peut se prévaloir de l’incomparable 
privilège de vivre en toute conscience son destin mortel. « La vérité de la chute 
est devenue notre vérité » peut-il dire désormais. … Caractérisée par la lucidité, 
[sa conscience] oublie les illusions immanentes au temps et reconsidère l’histoire 
en la privant de son aura. Elle l’envisage du point de vue du « dernier homme », 
cette espèce nouvelle qui a cessé de confondre devenir et absolu, qui a cessé de 
sacraliser le temps historique comme le faisaient les anciens en le rendant 
complice de l’intemporel ou d’un absolu transcendant qu’ils plaçaient dans le 
paradis, la fin des temps, ou dans d’autres utopies” (Jaudeau 40-41) ‘In a 
magisterial inversion, fallen man can prevail on account of his incomparable 
privilege to live in all awareness of his mortal destiny. “The truth of the fall has 
become our truth,” he can say from now on. … Characterized by lucidity, [his 
consciousness] forgets illusions that are immanent to time and reconsiders history 
while depriving it of its aura. It envisions it from the point of view of the “last 
man,” that new species that has ceased to confuse becoming and the absolute, 
which has ceased to make historical time sacred as the ancients did in rendering it 
complicit with the atemporal or with a transcendent absolute that they placed in 
paradise, the end of time, or in other utopias.’ 
 
12. For a discussion of pessimism and disappointment in Cioran, see Acquisto. 
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13. “Je disais l’autre jour à un ami que, tout en croyant plus à l’écriture, je ne 
voudrais pas y renoncer, que travailler était une illusion défendable et qu’après 
avoir gribouillé une page ou seulement une phrase, j’avais toujours envie de 
siffler” (O 1651) ‘I was saying the other day to a friend that, even while no longer 
believing in writing, I would not want to renounce it, that working is a defensible 
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